Recent Cases by unknown
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 4 
Issue 1 January 1939 Article 6 
1939 
Recent Cases 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases , 4 MO. L. REV. (1939) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol4/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-INTERSTATE COMMERCE--STATE TAXATION ON GRoss
INCOME
J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen
The Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 19332 provided for a tax on gross
receipts derived from trade, business, commerce, and investments. The tax
was to apply to both residents and non-residents who derived income from
sources within the state. However, the tax was not applicable to so much
of such gross income as is derived from interstate or foreign commerce to the
extent that the Constitution prohibits taxation of such commerce. A levy
was attempted against a manufacturer of machinery, eighty percent of which
was sold in interstate commerce. The Indiana Supreme Court held the ex-
action was valid.2
The United States Supreme Court declared the statute, as thus applied,
to be invalid. It was held that this was not a tax on domocile, nor a fran-
chise tax, nor an "in lieu" tax as was suggested by the state supreme court.4
This was purely a tax on gross receipts. The vice of such a statute, as pointed
out by the court, is that if the exaction were lawful
" . .it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by states
in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are manufac-
tured. Interstate Commerce would thus be subjected to the risk of
a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and
which the commerce clause forbids. We have repeatedly held that
such a tax is a regulation of, and a burden upon, interstate commerce
prohibited by article I, section 8, of the Constitution. The opinion
of the State Supreme Court stresses the generality and nondiscrimi-
natory character of the exaction but it is settled that this will not save
the tax if it directly burdens interstate commerce. '5
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, contended that the question of validity of the
tax turns upon whether or not there is an actual burden on interstate com-
merce. To condemn such taxes as a class ignores the fact that such a tax
might not actually be a burden on commerce. He pointed out that many of
the cases relied upon by the majorityt can be distinguished upon the ground
that they deal with transportation companies singled out for taxation. Here
the tax was actually not a burden, for it was non-discriminatory, general, and
1. 58 Sup. Ct. 913 (1938).
2. Indiana Acts 1933, c. 50.
3. Storen v. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co., 7 N. E. (2d) 941 (Ind. 1937).
4. Id. at 950.
5. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 916 (1938).
6. Id. at 920, 921.
7. Id. at 916, n. 10.
(64)
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uniform. He pointed out further that while it was true that in the future the
tax could be so multiplied as to become a burden, it is a question that can be
decided as it arises, for in the absence of such multiplication it is not a burden.
In 1919, the case of the American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis8 came
before the Court. It involved the validity of a city ordinance providing for
a municipal license fee for manufacturing. This was to be measured by the
volume of the gross receipts received from the sale of the manufactured product.
The appellant's goods were manufactured in St. Louis, shipped into other
states, stored, and later sold. It was contended that this exaction constituted
a burden on interstate commerce. This contention was rejected by the Court:
"There is no doubt of the power of the State, or of the city . . .to impose a license tax in the nature of an excise upon the conduct of
a manufacturing business in the city. . . . The city might have
measured such tax by a percentage upon the value of all goods manu-factured, whether they ever should come to be sold or not, and have re-quired payment as soon as, or even before, the goods left the factory.In order to mitigate the burden, . . . it has postponed ascertain-
ment and payment of the tax until the manufacturer can bring his
goods into market."19
The majority in the present case did not believe the American Manufac-
turing Co. case to be in point. The cases were distinguished upon the ground
that the St. Louis ordinance was an occupation tax; the exaction was not upon
sales made, nor the income derived from those sales, but the volume of the
sales was merely a method of measuring the value. The city could not have
levied a sales tax to include sales consummated in another state.10 Justice
Black, following the view of the Indiana Supreme Court,"- pointed out that
there was no difference in the operative effect of the two taxes.1 2
The view of the majority appears to be that a tax on gross receipts de-
rived from interstate commerce is in effect a tax on the commerce itself.1 3 A
state cannot tax commerce;' 4 then a tax on gross receipts, derived from such
commerce, is invalid.' 5
8. 250 U. S. 459 (1919).
9. Id. at 463.
10. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 916, 917 (1938).
11. 7 N. E. (2d) 941, 946 (Ind. 1937).
12. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 924 (1938).13. See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292, 295 (1917).
14. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).15. The cases relied upon by the Court for this proposition are: Cook v.Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 (1878); Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230 (1887);Phila. and So. S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887) (overruling StateTax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284 (U. S. 1872), which allowed suchtaxation); Galveston, H. and S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); Meyer v.Wells, Fargo and Co., 223 U. S. 298 (1912); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S.352, 400 (1913) (dictum); Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292(1917); United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 328 (1918)(dictum); N. J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338 (1930) ; Fisher's BlendStation v. Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 650 (1936); Western Livestock Co. v. Bureau
of Revenue, 58 Sup. Ct. 546 (1938) (dictum). The language appears to growprogressively stronger in the cases. A tax on net income will be sustained. SeeUnited States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918); Hump Hairpin
1939]
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However, it is agreed that a state possesses the power to tax property
within its jurisdiction even though it be employed in interstate commerce,1
and in taxing such property the state is not restricted to an ad valorem meas-
ure but may employ any appropriate means for reaching its actual or full
value, such as a tax measured by gross receipts.17 A state may not only tax
the property within its jurisdiction but may tax the occupations of manufac-
turing, extracting and producing such property, for production is not com-
merce.18 Similarly, here too, gross receipts derived from the sale of the goods
may be used as a measure of taxation.19
It is to be observed then that a tax "measured by" gross receipts will stand
if it impinges on taxable property or occupations; but if in the opinion of the
Court it does not impinge on one of these, it is to be considered as a tax "on"
gross receipts and fails.20
At this point one is confronted by a principle of constitutional law that
the constitutionality of a law depends not upon how it is characterized but
upon its effect.21 As noted above,22 both the dissent in the present case and
the Indiana Supreme Court have taken the position that there is no difference
in the operative effect of the exaction in the American Manufacturing Co. case
and the Indiana Gross Income Tax. This contention is denied nowhere in the
majority opinion. It would appear that if the two taxes have the same opera-
Mfg. Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290 (1922). The soundness of this distinction
has been questioned by the dissent in the present case. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v.
Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 922 (1938).
16. Western Union v. Atty. Gen., 125 U. S. 530 (1888); Pullman's Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); Ficklen v. Taxing District, 145
U. S. 1, 22 (1892); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194
(1897); Virginia v. Imp. Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15 (1934). See also, Rott-
schaefer, State Jurisdiction to Impose Taxes (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 305.
17. This is the so-called "in lieu" tax. It is considered to be a tax on prop-
erty "in lieu" of general property taxes. United States Express Co. v. Minnesota,
223 U. S. 335 (1912); Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450 (1918);
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132 (1918); Union
Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919). When the general property tax
has not been abolished, the tax will not be considered as "in lieu." Johnson v.
Wells, Fargo & Co., 239 U. S. 234 (1915); N. J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd., 280
U. S. 338 (1930). Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (1891) has been
cited as an "in lieu" tax case, but there is nothing in the language of the opinion
to this effect. See comment (1930) 18 CALIF. L. Rsv. 512, 519. For a criticism
see Beale, Taxation of Foreign Corporations (1904) 17 HARv. L. REV. 248.
18. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1 (1888); United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,
156 U. S. 1 (1895); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923); Utah
Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932).
19. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919); Hope Natural
Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1926); Western Livestock Co. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 58 Sup. Ct. 546 (1938).
20. See Brown, Constitutional Limitations on Progressive Taxation of Gross
Income (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 246.
21. Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 697 (1895); United States Ex-
press Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 346 (1912); St. Louis S. W. Ry. v.
Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 362 (1914); Kansas City, F. S. & M. Ry. v. Kansas,
240 U. S. 227, 331 (1916); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S.
219, 237 (1917).
22. See notes 10 and 11, supra.
[Vol. 4
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tive effect, they should stand or fall together. The question arises, where is
the possible discrepancy?
It has been suggested 23 that where a tax falls on a subject of commerce,
the Court considers not the burden of the particular tax before it, but the
burden which would result if the subject were taxed to the point of extinction.
The tax therefore is held bad. However, when a tax is not on a subject of com-
merce, it is manifest that only by recourse to its economic effect could it be de-
clared a regulation of commerce.24 The possible discrepancy appears to be
that when the tax is not on a subject of commerce the Court looks to see
whether there is actually a burden, but when it is on the subject of commerce
it presupposes that a burden results. 25 This appears to be based on Justice
Marshall's concept of ultimate sovereignty, i. e. if a state had the power to tax,
it could exercise this power to the uttermost and hence "the power to tax in-
volves the power to destroy.1126 It has been pointed out that the error in this
is that it fails to recognize distinctions of degree, 27 for, as a matter of fact, not
every tax is destructive; only unreasonable and discriminatory taxes destroy.28
A tax falling on the subject of commerce could be burdensome because it
is either discriminatory, or unreasonable, or both. It would appear that a
tax falling on a subject of commerce alone, without impinging on taxable
property, or without similarly affecting local commerce, would be in fact dis-
criminatory. The dissent brings out the point that many of the cases relied
upon by the majority can be so explained,29 for it is agreed that the slightest
discrimination is not permitted. 80
However, in the present case there is no question of discrimination be-
cause the tax similarly affected both local and national commerce. The tax,
therefore, must have been unreasonable to have been held bad. It was not con-
tended that the tax was so high as to be a palpable burden on commerce,31
23. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority By the Taxing
Powers of the States. 1I (1918) 31 HAav. L. REv. 572, 573.
24. Ibid.
25. Notice the language in the present case: "... if (the exaction) lawful
it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent .... ". J. D. Adams Mfg. Co.
v. Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 916 (1938).
26. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 413 (U. S. 1819).
27. Holmes' dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223(1928).
28. Note (1937) 13 IND. L. REv. 178, 180.
29. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 920, 921 (1938).
30. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566 (1878); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S.275 (1875). The principle of equality is an important safeguard, for legislators
will often hesitate to put an undue tax on commerce, if at the same time they
must similarly burden their own constituents. See HENDERSON, THE POSITION
OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1918) 118.
31. Compare N. J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338 (1930), where
a tax for the use of the highways to string poles along amounted to $3200 per
mile. It has been suggested that this probably was an influencing factor in de-
ciding the case. See Brown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal
and State Taxation in Inter-governmental Relations 1930-32 (1933) 81 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 247, 253. See notes: (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 750; (1930) 28 MICH. L.
L. REV. 1062; (1930) 18 CALIF. L. Rhv. 512.
1939]
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nor that the legislature had levied a tax not intended as a fair share of the bur-
den of government. 32 The only reason advanced is that such a tax as this is
a burden because it might result in multiplicity of taxation.3 But on this very
point the dissent takes issue:
"A formula which arbitrarily stamps every state gross receipts
tax as a violation of the Commerce Clause, on the ground that it can
be used for cumulative tax purposes, leaves unanswered the possibility
that other taxes, previously held valid, may be used with like effects
on interstate commerce; disregards the fact that in many cases, as here,
such a tax can be fairly and uniformly applied to both interstate and
intrastate commerce; and in effect actually denies a State the privilege
of using such a tax unless willing to impose unjust and unequal burdens
upon its own citizens engaged in intrastate commerce."34
A state under existing constitutional limitations must accommodate itself
under the double demand that interstate commerce pay its own way and at
the same time it must not burden such commerce with cumulative exactions
not similarly laid on local commerce.38 It appears that the majority in the pres-
ent case chose to stress the latter point of multiplicity at the expense of leav-
ing some rather pertinent objections unanswered.
GIDEON HENRY SCHILLER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTECTION
Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp.1
By Amendment Twenty-One of the Federal Constitution, "The transporta-
tion or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States,
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors . . . is hereby prohibited."
32. See Severance, Gross Earnings Taxes Levied by States (1921) 7 A.B.
A.J. 113, where it is suggested that the Court concerns itself with the intention
of the legislature.
33. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 915 (1938).
34. Id. at 924. Compare Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 253 (1929), in
which Stone, J., remarked: "Nor can I find any practical justification . . . for an
interpretation of the commerce clause which would relieve those engaged in in-
terstate commerce from their fair share of the expense of government of the
states in which they operate by exempting them from the payment of a tax of
general application, which is neither aimed at nor discriminates against inter-
state comnerce." See also, Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252,
259 (1919); N. J. Bell Tel. Co. v. State Board, 280 U. S. 338, 349 (1930);
Perkins, The Sales Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce (1934) 12
N. C. L. REv. 99, 106. The contrary view has been expressed in Robbins v. Tax-
ing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497 (1887): "Interstate Commerce cannot be taxed
at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic com-
merce." Subsequent authority for this view has been collected by the majority
in the present case at 916. As to what devices the states are now employing
to have interstate commerce contribute to the burden of government, see
Schlesinger and Warren, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its
Way (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 49.
35. Western Livestock Co. v. Bureau of Rev., 58 Sup. Ct. 546, 553 (1938).
1. 58 Sup. Ct. 952 (1938).
[Vol. 4
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The appellee corporation in this case secured a license from the Liquor Con-
trol Commissioner of Minnesota in 1934, and carried on the business of whole-
sale dealer in liquor in thai state. It was an Illinois corporation. In 1935 the
Minnesota legislature passed the following act: "No licensed manufacturer
or wholesaler shall import any brand or brands of intoxicating liquors con-
taining more than 25 per cent of alcohol by volume ready for sale without
further processing unless such brand or brands shall be duly registered in the
patent office of the United States." 2 The business of the corporation involved
the sale of many liquors of more than the twenty-five per cent by volume which
had not been registered. An injunction to restrain enforcement of the act was
denied by the Supreme Court. According to the Court, the fact that the stat-
ute resulted in discrimination against imported liquors, although due to no rea-
sonable classification, did not make the statute invalid, because the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the control of the
liquor traffic, due to the Twenty-First Amendment. The Court stated that no
classification recognized by the Twenty-First Amendment would be deemed
forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This case was the third one involving the Twenty-First Amendment that
has reached the Court. In the first case, that- of Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v.
Grosscup,3 a statute of Pennsylvania was involved which required a higher
license fee of importers of beer than of those dealers handling the local prod-
uct. The district court had held the statute to be valid,4 under the Twenty-
First Amendment, even though some of the effects of the regulations might be
to favor domestic products. While the district court, however, stated that the
commerce clause availed the plaintiff nothing in that case,5 it went on to say that
no privilege or immunity of the plaintiff was violated, and that the fact that
some of the regulations favored domestic products did not in itself render the
state law obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment.6 It will thus be seen that
the district court did not decide that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply
to the regulation of liquor traffic due to the Twenty-First Amendment. On ap.
peal, the Supreme Court refused to consider the constitutional question, the
plaintiff being deemed without standing to present it, 7 and the decision of the
district court was affirmed.
The next case was that of the State Board of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's
Market Co.8 In that case a tax discriminating against foreign manufacturers
of liquor was upheld as being valid. It was the plaintiff's contention in the
case that the equal protection and commerce clauses were violated. The Court
2. Minn. Laws 1935, c. 390, p. 720.
3. 298 U. S. 226 (1936).
4. Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Pa. 1935).
5. Id. at 972.
6. Id. at 972, 973.
7. Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 298 U. S. 226, 227 (1936).
8. 299 U. S. 59 (1936), noted in (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 92.
1939]
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admitted that the statute would have been unconstitutional prior to the Twenty-
First Amendment, as it would have been in violation of the commerce clause,
but it was stated that the Twenty-First Amendment allowed such discrimina-
tion.9 It was in this case that the Court first said that a classification recog-
nized by the Twenty-First Amendment could not be deemed forbidden by the
Fourteenth. However, the Court also said that the classification rested on
conditions requiring different treatment.'0 Query, as to whether the Court con-
sidered the Fourteenth Amendment to be abrogated, as to the control and reg-
ulation of the liquor traffic, by the Twenty-First Amendment. Certainly, the
language of the Court is not clearly decisive one way or the other. It may be
noted in passing that the Supreme Court, in deciding the Young's Market
case as it did, overruled the district court. The lower court had stated definitely
that the Twenty-First Amendment did not except liquor from the commerce
clause or from other constitutional limitations. 1
In the principal case the Court has decided the chief remaining question
left by previous decisions, and it is now settled that the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply in cases involving the regulation
of intoxicating liquors by a state. Obviously, if this one clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment no longer applies, then neither will the due process clause of the
same amendment. The effect is to give to states complete and autonomic con-
trol over the regulation of liquor.
Prior to the Eighteenth Amendment Congress had acted to remove the liq-
uor traffic from the protection of the commerce clause. These acts were the
Wilson Act in 1890,12 the Webb-Kenyon Act in 1913,18 and the Reed Amend-
ment in 1917.14 The effect of these acts was only to remove liquor from the pro-
tection of the commerce clause, and no more. Considering the fact that the
wording of the Webb-Kenyon Act and that of the Twenty-First Amendment are
almost identical, it may well have been the purpose of Congress to remove
liquor from the protection of the commerce clause and divest it of its interstate
character, and nothing further. Some of the discussion in Congress at the time
of the passage of the Amendment would indicate as much, at any rate. 9
True enough, the Webb-Kenyon Act was still in effect at the time of the passage
of the Twenty-First Amendment,'6 but the purpose of making the provision
part of the Constitution may have been to guard against repeal of the provi-
sion by some future Congress.
9. Id. at 62.
10. Id. at 64.
11. Young's Market Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Cal., 12 F. Supp.
140 (S. D. Cal. 1935).
12. 26 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. § 121 (1937), upheld in In re Rahrer,
140 U. S. 545 (1891).
13. 37 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. § 122 (1937), upheld in Clark Distilling
Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
14. 39 STAT. 1069 (1917), 18 U. S. C. § 341 (1927), upheld in United States
v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919).
15. 76 Cong. Record 2198, 4140-4141, 4170-4172 (1933).
16. McCormick & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 286 U. S. 131 (1932).
[Vol. 4
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While the Court may be justified in a literal interpretation of the words
of the Twenty-First Amendment, at least there may be a reasonable difference
of opinion as to whether the amendment should have been so construed. Prior
to the decision in the Young's Market case, in some of the federal district courts
it had been held that neither the equal protection nor the commerce clauses were
abrogated by the Twenty-First Amendment,17 and in other federal district court
cases it had been held that the equal protection clause was still applicable to
the regulation of liquor by a state.' 8 Subsequent to the Young's Market case,
it was still held that the regulation of intoxicating liquors was subject to the
equal protection clause.' 9
There is one further question which has not been decided by the Supreme
Court. In certain states statutes have been passed, discriminating not between
local and outstate liquor, but between classes of outstate liquor. Two such cases
have reached the federal district courts, and in both cases it was decided that
such discrimination was constitutional, due to the Twenty-First Amendment.
20
Both of these cases were decided after the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Young's Market case. On the basis of decided cases, it is fair to assume that
these decisions will be upheld by the Supreme Court.
JOHN P. HASHAW
CRImINAL LAw-POSSESSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN PROPERTY-QUESTION FOR
JURY
State v. Tisher'
The principal evidence offered by the state in a larceny case was to the
effect that the stolen property was found in the defendant's home a short time
after it had been stolen. The defendant attempted to explain his possession of
the stolen property by testifying that, while intoxicated, he had purchased the
property from a stranger. The defendant contends on appeal that the evidence
offered by the state was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The supreme court,
after determining that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict, quoted
17. Joseph Triner Corp. v. Arundel, 11 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1935);
Young's Market Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 12 F. Supp. 140 (S. D. Cal.
1935) ; Pacific Fruit and Produce Co. v. Martin, 16 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Wash.
1936).
18. Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Pa.
1935); General Sales and Liquor Co. v. Becker, 14 F. Supp. 348 (E. D. Mo.
1936); Dugan v. Bridges, 16 F. Supp. 694 (D. N. H. 1936).
19. Zukaitis v. Fitzgerald, 18 F. Supp. 1000 (W. D. Mich. 1936) (semble);
Joseph Triner Corp. v. Mahoney, 20 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Minn. 1937).
20. Indianapolis Brewing Co., Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm., 21 F. Supp. 969
(E. D. Mich. 1938); Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 23 F. Supp. 244
(W. D. Mo. 1938).
1. 119 S. W. (2d) 212 (Mo. 1938).
1939]
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with approval the following, taken from a previous case: 2 "The inferences to
be drawn from the exclusive possession by accused of property recently stolen
are entirely a matter for the jury. Such possession, even though unexplained,
raises no presumption of guilt as a matter of law . .. The reasonableness
and credibility of the explanation given by accused as to the manner in which
he acquired possession of the stolen property is a question of fact to be con-
sidered by the jury, or the judge before whom the case is tried without a jury,
in connection with the other facts and circumstances in evidence. The im-
probability of the explanation does not remove it from his or their consideration;
nor on the other hand does its plausibility, although uncontradicted by the state,
require an acquittal."
The courts are in complete discord as to what effect the unexplained pos-
session of recently stolen goods has upon the guilt of the accused.3 Missouri at
one time held that the possession of recently stolen property raised a conclusive
presumption of guilt, unless rebutted or refuted by the circumstances of the
taking, or by reasonable proof that such possession was innocently or honestly
acquired. It was not a mere presumption of fact to be weighed with other
evidence. 4 Today the Missouri court has changed its position and holds, in agree-
ment with the trend of authorities, that recent unexplained possession of stolen
property warrants an inference that the possessor was the thief, such inference
to be considered by the jury with the other evidence offered.5
This opinion declares that the plausibility of the explanation, although un-
contradicted by the state, does not require an acquittal. This view is supported
by some authority,6 although it seems contrary to the usual rule, in both civil
and criminal cases, that if reasonable men could not conclude otherwise the
court will direct a verdict.7 In accordance with the latter principle, other courts
2. State v. McLane, 55 S. W. (2d) 956' (Mo. 1932). This quotation was
in turn taken from 36 C. J. 920, 921.
3. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE: (2d ed. 1923) 509; 36 C. J. 870-920; 2 WHARTON,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (10th ed. 1912) 1508; Ewbank, Possession of Stolen Prop-
erty as Evidence of Guilt (1897) 45 CENT. L. J. 388.
4. State v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608 (1881); State v. Owens, 79 Mo. 619 (1883);
State v. Phelps, 91 Mo. 478, 4 S. W. 119 (1886); State v. Moore, 101 Mo. 316,
14 S. W. 182 (1890); State v. Owsley, 111 Mo. 450, 20 S. W. 194 (1892).
5. State v. Swarens, 294 Mo. 139, 241 S. W. 934 (1922) ; State v. Slusher,
301 Mo. 285, 256 S. W. 817 (1923); State v. Wagner, 311 Mo. 391, 279 S. W.
23 (1925); State v. Bryant, 24 S. W. (2d) 1008 (Mo. 1930); State v. Plaster,
43 S. W. (2d) 1042 (Mo. 1931); State v. Weaver, 56 S. W. (2d) 25 (Mo. 1932);
State v. Enochs, 339 Mo. 953, 98 S. W. (2d) 685 (1936).
6. Tucker v. State, 86 Fla. 36, 96 So. 10 (1923); Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla.
401, 116 So. 11 (1928); State v. Carter, 144 Iowa 280, 121 N. W. 694 (1909);
State v. Seitz, 194 Iowa 1057; 187 N. W. 695 (1922); State v. Moore, 101 Mo.
316, 14 S. W. 182 (1890); State v. Owsley, 111 Mo. 450, 20 S. W. 194 (1892);
State v. McLane, 55 S. W. (2d) 956 (Mo. 1932); State v. Willette, 46 Mont. 326,
127 Pac. 1013 (1912); State v. Gurr, 40 Utah 162, 120 Pac. 209; State v. Smith,
179 Wis. 170, 190 N. W. 905 (1922).
7. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Martin, 283 U. S. 209 (1931); In re Fleming's
Estate, 199 Cal. 750, 251 Pac. 637 (1926); Ankeney v. Brenton, 214 Iowa 357,
238 N. W. 71 (1931) ; Field v. Hamm, 254 Mass. 268, 150 N. E. 3 (1926) ; Torrel
v. Hardy, 196 S. W. 1100 (Mo. 1917); State v. Frisby, 204 S. W. 3 (Mo. 1918);
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hold that if the defendant can show by uncontradicted explanation that his
possession was innocent, a conviction is unwarranted.8
It is suggested that this difference of viewpoint may be partially explained
on the theory that the Missouri, and other courts in accord, although saying
that it is the unexplained, exclusive, and recent possession which warrants the
inference of guilt, in reality allow the inference to be drawn from the exclusive
and recent possession whether there is an explanation or not; while the courts
holding to the contrary allow the inference of guilt to arise only from the failure
to satisfactorily explain the exclusive and recent possession.
In the light of what has been said, it seems that the Missouri court is look-
ing too hard at the possession of the recently stolen goods. It would be better
to consider the picture in its entirety. The explanation should be considered in
connection with the possession, and if the explanation is plausible, consistent
with innocence, and not attacked by the state, a directed verdict is warranted.
JAMES H. OTTMAN
HoMESTEADS-WIFE's PRIVILEGE TO CLAIM iN ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY
Ahmann v. Kemperl
Record title to an eighty acre tract of land stood in the name of Mary E.
Summers, and record title to an abutting eighty acre tract of land stood in the
names of Edwin J. and Mary E. Summers, as husband and wife. Subsequently
the husband and wife borrowed $2,200 from plaintiff on their unsecured note.
After Edwin J.'s death, defendant and her minor son continued to occupy the
two tracts as their homeplace. Defendant conveyed the homestead to John
Kemper for $1.00 and other considerations, and nine days later married John
Kemper. Plaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant, acquired the deed
to the land at a sheriff's sale without giving defendant notice to claim her home-
stead, then brought suit in this case to have the deed to Kemper invalidated and
title vested in plaintiff, and also to have ejected from possession the tenants on
the land at the time of the suit. It was held that the defendant had home-
stead rights in her own land and also the land originally held with her husband
State v. Kinnamon, 314 Mo. 662, 285 S. W. 62 (1926); Masdon v. Stine, 66 S. W.
(2d) 579 (Mo. App. 1933). Of course, a verdict of guilty cannot be directed in a
criminal action. United States v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 470 (C. C. D. Kan., 1882);
State v. McNamara, 212 Mo. 150, 110 S. W. 1067 (1908); State v. Picker, 64
Mo. App. 126 (1895); People v. Walker, 198 N. Y. 329, 91 N. E. 806 (1910).
8. Davis v. State, 50 Ga. App. 103, 176 S. E. 901 (1934); State v. Delanty,
211 Iowa 50, 230 N. W. 436 (1930); State v. McKinney, 76 Kan. 419, 91 Pac.
1068 (1907), commented on in (1908) 6 MiCE. L. REV. 263; Brown v. State, 126
Tex. Crim. Rep. 9, 70 S. W. (2d) 192 (1934).
1. 119 S. W. (2d) 256 (Mo. 1938).
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in the entirety; that the transfer of said interest was valid, and that this inter-
est is exempt from all debts.
A debt of one spouse, or even judgment upon the debt of one spouse and
execution thereon, could, according to Missouri courts, in no way affect land held
by the entirety, for neither husband nor wife has a separate interest to the ex-
clusion of the other. 2 This rule codifies the common law rule as to estates by
the entirety in which neither owner has an interest to the exclusion of the other;
but where the whole is owned by each, and upon the death of one, the other con-
tinues to own the whole.3 In jurisdictions where the common law estate by the
entirety is obsolete or abolished, there are two ways in which courts treat a
creditor of one of the tenants: some allow the creditor of one to take that tenant's
right of survivorship; others even allow the creditor to take a present right to
one-half the rents and profits of the property.4
Where there is a joint indebtedness on the part of tenants in the entirety,
there seem to be no reasons why there should not be recovery for the benefit of
the creditors. 5 The cases hold that estates are subject to execution on such joint
debts,6 and to hold otherwise would be overextending the very technical rules of
tenancy by the entirety.
The right of homestead exemption7 from all creditors presents somewhat of
a problem in the case of an estate by the entirety. It is established law that
the right of a homestead cannot take precedence over a pre-existing debt,8 and
it is equally well settled that an existing homestead is unaffected by any liability
thereafter created.9 The question of when the surviving spouse acquires his or
her homestead rights in an estate by the entirety raises a difficult problem.
2. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918);
Ashbaugh v. Ashbaugh, 273 Mo. 353, 201 S. W. 72 (1918); Mahen v. Ruhr, 293
Mo. 500, 240 S. W. 164 (1922); Kingman v. Banks, 251 S. W. 449 (Mo. App.
1923); City of Laclede to use of Abell v. Libby, 221 Mo. App. 703, 285 S. W.
178 (1926); Notes (1923) 27 A. L. R. 826, (1925) 35 A. L. R. 147.
3. Bains v. Bullock, 129 Mo. 117 , 31 S. W. 342 (1895); Frost v. Frost,
200 Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527 (1906); Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo.
159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918); Wimbush v. Danford, 292 Mo. 588, 238 S. W. 460
(1922).
4. Wilkerson, Creditors' Rights Against Tenants by the Entirety (1933) 11
TENN. L. REv. 139.
5. Comment (1929) 43 HARv. L. REv. 312.
6. Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Montz v.
Reutter, 268 Mich. 357, 256 N. W. 351 (1934); Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107,
18 S. W. (2d) 388 (1929); Arch Street Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Sook, 104 Penn.
Super. 269, 158 Atl. 595 (1931).
7. Mo. Rav. STAT. (1929) § 608, Mo. STAT. ANN. § 600, p. 4221, provides:
"The homestead of every housekeeper or head of a family, consisting of a dwell-
ing house and appurtenances . . . shall . . . be exempt from . . . execution
.; such homestead in the country shall not include more than one hundred
and sixty acres of land, or exceed the total value of fifteen hundred dollars. .. .
8. Stivers v. Home, 62 Mo. 473 (1876) ; Creath v. Dale, 69 Mo. 41 (1878);
Kelsay v. Fraier, 78 Mo. 111 (1883); Butler v. Roer, 163 Mo. App. 283, 146 S.
W. 811 (1912); Mo. Rzv. STAT. (1929) § 615, Mo. STAT. ANN. § 615, p. 4234.
9. Maupin v. Longacre and Bank of Kingsville, 315 Mo. 872, 288 S. W. 54
(1926); Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 615, Mo. STAT. ANN. § 615, p. 4234.
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Such an estate is the same in Missouri now as was the common law estate by
the entirety, where husband and wife were considered as one person and could
not take by moieties.10 At common law, both the husband and wife were seized
of the entirety "per tout et non per my."'I Such facts would seemingly lead one
to believe that the husband and wife each get the entire estate at the time of the
grant, at which time the homestead right in the property accrues, and the death
of one, despite the right of survivorship, does not give to the one living a greater
or any different estate than he or she held while both were alive. This reason-
ing can be differentiated from the reasoning of the court in the case of Morrow
v. Zane,12 where the husband did not die, but conveyed his interest to his wife.
There, an indebtedness which was incurred subsequent to the estate by the en-
tirety was held to be an indebtedness incurred prior to the acquisition of the
newly conveyed property, and the wife could not claim a homestead exemption
in the share conveyed. From the common law estate by the entirety, it seems
that in the case of survivorship, the homestead attaches upon the recording of
the grant of the estate and not upon the death of the husband. As between the
husband and wife there can be but one homestead right which must be asserted
in the name of the husband while the marriage relations exist, for he is the head
of the family within the meaning of the statute concerning exemptions.' s The
wife may invoke the laws on exemption on her husband's property if he fails to
do so,1 4 and upon her own property if her husband has not yet claimed exemp-
tion.'5 In the case of land held by the entirety, if no homestead has yet been
claimed by the husband or wife to be exempt from debts, and one spouse dies,
then the other, if he or she still be head of a family, i.e. manages the affairs of
the family,'6 gets a homestead in the land. Such homestead belongs to the head
10. Bains v. Bullock, 129 Mo. 117, 31 S. W. 342 (1895); Frost v. Frost, 200
Mo. 474, 98 S. W. 527 (1906); Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo.
159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918); Wimbush v. Danford, 292 Mo. 588, 238 S. W. 460
(1922). Contra: Fulbright v. Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 329 Mo. 207,
44 S. W. (2d) 115 (1931).
11. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464 (1888).
12. 185 Mo. App. 111, 170 S. W. 918 (1914).
13. Gladney v. Berkley, 75 Mo. App. 98 (1898); White v. Smith, 104 Mo.
App. 199, 78 S. W. 51 (1904).
14. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 2998, Mo. STAT. ANN. § 2998, p. 5055, provides:
.. a married woman may invoke all exemption and homestead laws. ...
for the protection of personal and real property owned by the head of a family,
except . . . where the husband has claime& such exemption and homestead
rights for the protection of his own property." Crouch v. Holterman, 272 Mo.
432, 199 S. W. 193 (1917); Gladney v. Berkley, 75 Mo. App. 98 (1898).
15. Rouse v. Caton, 168 Mo. 288, 67 S. W. 578 (1902); Sharp v. Stewart,
185 Mo. 518, 84 S. W. 963 (1904); Gladney v. Berkley, 75 Mo. App. 98 (1898);
White v. Smith, 104 Mo. App. 199, 78 S. W. 51 (1904); Ludwig v. Carr, 210 Mo.
App. 489, 240 S. W. 515 (1922).
16. Broyles v. Cox, 153 Mo. 242, 54 S. W. 488 (1899); Jarboe v. Jarboe,
106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S. W. 1162 (1904); Forbes v. Groves, 134 Mo. App. 729,
115 S. W. 451 (1909); Elliot v. Thomas, 161 Mo. App. 441, 143 S. W. 563
(1912); Hyde v. Honiter, 175 Mo. App. 583, 158 S. W. 83 (1913); Peterson v.
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of the family, and, since the same is exempt from execution, creditors have no
right to complain of the disposition thereof;17 and any conveyance, regardless of
lack of consideration cannot be a fraud on the creditors. Of course, if the land
conveyed without consideration exceeds the amount allowed for a homestead, the
excess can be levied upon in execution; but if the land is sold on execution with-
out giving notice to the owner of his homestead right, the sale is void.18
Such facts being considered in the light of the case under discussion, one
may say that the established law in Missouri points to the facts that the land
held by the entirety did constitute the homestead of defendant at the date of her
conveyance of said land to Kemper; that as such the conveyance could not be
fraudulent as to existing creditors of defendant, and the title acquired by plain-
tiff in the sheriff's sale was void. Query: could defendant, having thus acquired
one homestead as provided by statute, during her first marriage, have acquired
another homestead on subsequently acquired land, to be exempt from sub-
sequently accrued indebtedness and new creditors on the basis of her second
marriage with Kemper, by asserting that as to this second marriage there had
not yet been a homestead claimed?
RALPH J. TucKER
HOMICIDE-KILLING IN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT FELONY
State v. Wright'
The State's evidence tended to show that the defendant committed homicide
while robbing the deceased's drug store. The defense offered evidence that the
supposed robbery was a fake, carried out at the instigation of the deceased, in
order to collect robbery insurance. The trial court instructed regarding first
degree murder and a verdict of guilty was returned. On appeal the supreme
court, reversing and remanding the case,2 said that an instruction should also be
given on second degree murder on the possible theory that the appellant killed
17. Bank of Versailles v. Guthrey, 127 Mo. 189, 29 S. W. 1004 (1895); Macke
v. Byrd, 131 Mo. 682, 33 S. W. 448 (1895); Creech v. Childers, 156 Mo. 338,
56 S. W. 1106 (1900); Star v. Smith, 183 Mo. 464, 81 S. W. 1217 (1904);
Armor v. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568, 161 S. W. 251 (1913); Pocoke v. Peterson, 256
Mo. 501, 165 S. W. 1017 (1914); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S. W. (2d)
769 (1928) ; Farmers Bank of Higginsville v. Handly, 320 Mo. 754, 9 S. W. (2d)
880 (1928).
18. Creech v. Childers, 156 Mo. 338, 56 S. W. 1106 (1900).
1. 112 S. W. (2d) 571 (Mo. 1937).
2. State v. Wright, 337 Mo. 441, 85 S. W. (2d) 7 (1935). See (1936) 1 Mo.
L. REv. 87, for a discussion of the court's disposition of the case on the ground
that there might be inferred from the defendant's testimony such consent on the
part of the victim as to negative any robbery. The writer there expresses the
opinion that there was no robbery, not because the victim consented, but rather be-
cause the accused did not intend to rob.
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while perpetrating a conspiracy to defraud. The accused was again convicted
of first degree murder and he again appealed, complaining of the court's failure
to charge on manslaughter.
The question was whether the appellant, granting his testimony to be true,
was committing anything less than a felony3 when the homicide occurred. It was
concluded that the acts, at the very least, constituted an attempt 4 to defraud the
victim's insurer. The attempt was not affected by the fact that there was no
insurer to defraud.5 Further, the attempt to defraud is a felony by statute,6 and
therefore the appellant was guilty, at least, of murder in the second degree.7
It was, therefore, proper to omit an instruction upon manslaughter.
Unfortunately, however, the court had said on the first appeal that if the
appellant's testimony was true, he killed while "engaged in the perpetration of
a conspiracy to defraud," and that this offense was such a felony as to place
the homicide in the second degree murder pigeon-hole. Attempt was not men-
tioned. Oddly enough, the second holding agreed with the defendant that, there
being no insurer, the accused could not be said to have been perpetrating a con-
spiracy to defraud. Thereupon the court hastily retreated to the refuge of the at-
tempt theory.
The readiness of the court to admit the vulnerability of its prior holding
gives rise to the question: What was meant by the words, "perpetration of a
conspiracy to defraud?" There are three alternatives. First, was this the statu-
tory crime of conspiracy,8 the unlawful agreement? Unquestionably the answer
is no, because that crime is only a misdemeanor,9 whereas the court speaks of a
felony. The word conspiracy was probably used in the popular, rather than the
technical, sense. Second, was this a crime that went beyond mere attempt to
3. The Missouri courts adhere to the concept that generally a homicide
committed during the perpetration of a felony is murder, the felony taking the
place of the necessary intent. The felonies of rape, burglary, arson, robbery,
and mayhem are designated by statute to be so serious as to replace both intent
and deliberation, thereby making the killing first degree murder. Homicideduring all felonies, other than those mentioned, is regarded as murder in the
second degree even though unintentional. If the unlawful act is a misdemeanor,
the unintentional homicide committed in the perpetration thereof is manslaughter.
See State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516 (1889); State v. Robinett, 279S. W. 696 (Mo. 1926); State v. Lindsey, 333 Mo. 139, 62 S. W. (2d) 420 (1933).
Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §§ 3982, 3983, 3988.
4. State v. Block, 333 Mo. 127, 131, 132, 62 S. W. (2d)428, 431 (1933).
5. State v. Mitchell, 170 Mo. 633, 71 S. W. 175 (1902); State v. Block, 333
Mo. 127, 62 S. W. (2d) 428 (1933); Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 4041, 4442, pp. 2846,
3048; Arnold, Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction (1930)
40 YALE L. J. 53; Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts(1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REV. 962; Curran, Criminal and Non-Criminal Attempts(1931) 19 GEORGETOWN L. J. 185; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932)§ 221, 224; 16 C. J. § 96, p. 116.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 4095, 4304.
7. State v. Robinett, 279 S. W. 696 (Mo. 1926), cited note 3, supra.
8. State v. Porter, 199 S. W. 158 (Mo. 1917); State v. Dalton, 134 Mo.
App, 517, 114 S. W. 1132 (1908); Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 4460, 3686, 4243,
4244.
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 4460, 3686, 4243, 4244.
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defraud,10 that the illusory line between attempt and consummation was crossed
and that the felony was consummated? True, this is the only interpretation that
admits of a defense of impossibility,"' and the second opinion allows such a
defense. Notwithstanding this, certainly the court did not presume, contrary to
all the facts, that the defendant's testimony indicated such success. Third,
did the court mean to say that the appellant killed while he was attempting to
perpetrate a fraud? Of the three interpretations this is most apt to be the one
intended and is the best. Obviously, the accused was in the process of com-
mitting the felony. He was executing acts which tended toward the completed
crime but which fell short of the goal. This can be no more than attempt. The
only consequence of this view is that the first opinion speaks of attempt, but
under the name of perpetration of a conspiracy to defraud; then the second
opinion presumes to dispose of it on the ground of impossibility, and comes
back to the same theory, attempt, but under no disguises.
It would have been a happier solution if the court had specifically said on
the first appeal that the appellant committed homicide while in the perpetration
of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, a fraud. The crime would have all the req-
uisites of second degree murder and the superfluous talk about the nonexistence
of an insurer would rightly have had no place in the decision. The accused was
being tried for murder, and not fraud. The attendant offense had no significance
other than that it was given the force by statute to take the place of the intent
necessary to murder, and to that end attempt is as potent as the finished crime.
The Missouri legislature recognized this in phrasing the first degree murder
statute so as to give the attempt to rob, rape, et cetera, the same effect as the
completed crime in establishing the murder.12
JESSE D. JAMES
MALIcIOus PROSECUTION-EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL, DISCHARGE, AND ABANDONMENT
ON PROBABLE CAUSE
Groda, v. American Stores Co.1
In the criminal case, information was made by defendant charging plaintiff
with larceny. The case against plaintiff was dismissed before the alderman
10. The next step beyond attempt is the completion of the attempted crime.
Curran, loc. cit. supra note 5 (the completed crime and the attempt are mutually
exclusive). 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 212 (the attempt must be unfinished,
otherwise the indictment would be for a completed crime). See Columbian Ins.
Co. v. Modern Laundry, 277 Fed. 355, 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921) (an attempt to
defraud must fail, whereas a fraud must be completed; that is, there must be
deceit and injury.)
11. 1 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 5.
12. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3982.
1. 315 Pa. 484, 173 Atl. 419 (1934), 94 A. L. R. 738 (1935).
[Vol. 4
15
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
RECENT OASES
for lack of evidence. Plaintiff brought trespass for malicious prosecution and
obtained a verdict. Upon appeal, the court, in holding that it was error to charge
the jury that the burden of showing probable cause shifted to the defendant
when plaintiff had been discharged in the criminal case, said: "Neither an
acquittal of the defendant in a criminal prosecution, nor the ignoring of the
bill against him by the grand jury, nor his discharge by the examining magistrate,
constitutes proof of want of probable cause, or shifts the burden of proof to the
defendant in the civil action."
The effect of the termination of the criminal proceedings in favor of the
plaintiff would seem logically to depend upon the nature of the proceedings in
which the suit was terminated. If the issue was the probable guilt of the ac-
cused, as is the case in a preliminary hearing, then evidence of a discharge
would seem to be pertinent to show want of probable cause for instituting the
proceedings. The majority of authorities are in accord with this view and do
not support the principal case. 2 The Missouri authorities are not in agreement
with the principal case in this respect.3
Where the issue was not whether there was probable cause for holding the
accused, but whether he was guilty, and where he may have been dismissed for
lack of evidence, or for failure to prosecute, as where an acquittal terminated
the proceedings or where they were terminated at the instance of the prosecuting
attorney or the prosecuting witness, evidence of the acquittal or dismissal should
not be competent to show want of probable cause. In such a situation the case
may have terminated in favor of accused for a variety of reasons, none of which
indicates that there was want of probable cause for instituting the proceedings.
Here again the majority of the courts are in accord with the logical rule.4
The Missouri courts, however, have sometimes held that the evidence of an
acquittal should be considered by the jury along with other circumstances on
the question of the want of probable cause.5 It has been said that evidence of an
acquittal is persuasive evidence of the want of probable cause.6 Just how much
2. The cases are collected in (1923) 24 A. L. R. 261; (1935) 94 A. L. R. 744;
(1938) 114 A. L. R. 873. See also, RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed Final Draft
No. 3, 1937) § 1210 (1).
3. Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47, 67 S. W. 650 (1902); Smith v. Glynn,
144 S. W. 149 (Mo. App. 1912); DeWitt v. Syfon, 202 Mo. App. 469, 211 S. W.
716 (1919). See State ex rel. Mann v. Trimble, 290 Mo. 661, 232 S. W. 100
(1921); Christian v. Hanna, 58 Mo. App. 37 (1894).
4. The cases are collected in (1923) 24 A. L. R. 261; (1935) 94 A. L. R. 744;
(1938) 114 A. L. R. 873. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed Final Draft
No. 3, 1937) 1214 (2).
5. Williams v. Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339 (1844); Christian v. Hanna, 58 Mo.
App. 37 (1894); Rosendale v. Market Square Dry Goods Co., 213 S. W. 169
(Mo. App. 1919), where the court speaks of discharge, though plaintiff was really
acquitted before a jury in justice's court. But see Eckerle v. Higgins, 159 Mo.
App. 177, 140 S. W. 616 (1911), where the logical argument is employed (but
the case was one where there was a dismissal); Harris v. Quincy, 0. & K. C.
R. R., 172 Mo. App. 261, 157 S. W. 893 (1913) (proof of failure of proceedings
against plaintiff held not to be evidence of want of probable cause).
6. Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo. 326, 197 S. W. 68 (1917) (where there had
been a conviction in a police court reversed on appeal with a trial de novo, the
19391
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weight is given to this evidence is sometimes said to depend upon the particular
way in which the verdict was rendered.7
The Missouri law is not clear with regard to the question of the effect to be
given to an abandonment of the criminal proceedings. Here again the courts
sometimes intimate that some effect should be given to evidence of a dismissal
by the prosecuting witness or the prosecuting attorney.8
GERALD B. ROWAN
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE-FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY
La Font v. Richardson'
In a malicious prosecution action defendant appealed from a judgment for
plaintiff, the only assignment of error being that the court erred in denying
defendant's demurrers to the evidence offered at the close of plaintiff's case and
at the conclusion of the whole testimony. The defendants, prior to the instiga-
tion of the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff for burglary and larceny,
consulted the prosecuting attorney and contended that this fact should exonerate
them as it showed probable cause for the prosecution. In affirming the judgment
of the circuit court, the appellate court said that if the prosecuting witnesses
consulted the prosecuting attorney in good faith, communicated to him all the
ascertainable facts, and acting on his advice instituted criminal proceedings, they
court in this case holds that the first conviction is not conclusive evidence of
probable cause and, furthermore, that acquittal on the trial de novo is persuasive
evidence of want of probable cause). But see Wilcox v. Gilmore, 320 Mo. 980,
8 S. W. (2d) 961 (1928) (where doubt is cast on Hanser v. Bieber as an au-
thority).
7. Brant v. Higgins, 10 Mo. 728 (1847), in which the court said, "... if ajury should render their verdict from the jury box, without deliberation, this
would be a circumstance to give weight to that verdict, as evidence of the want
of probable cause."
8. State ex rel. Mann v. Trimble, 290 Mo. 661, 232 S. W. 100 (1921) (where
an instruction was upheld which told the jury that "the dismissal of the in-
formation by the prosecuting attorney was evidence that the prosecution was
without probable cause"). Citing Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo. 326, 197 S. W. 68(1917), the court says: "Hence, if an acquittal is persuasive evidence of want of
probable cause, by a parity of reasoning the same rule should apply upon the
dismissal of a criminal information." Also see Eagleton v. Kabrich, 66 MG.
App. 231 (1896). In Polk v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. R., 341 Mo. 1213, 111
S. W. (2d) 138 (1937), the court said that the dismissal of a criminal prosecution
did not conclusively establish want of probable cause. In Eckerle v. Higgins,
159 Mo. App. 177, 140 S. W. 616 (1911), a dismissal by prosecuting attorney was
held insufficient to make a prim facie case of lack of probable cause. In Higgins
v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S. W. (2d) 805 (1934),
voluntary dismissal by prosecuting attorney said not to be evidence of want of
probable cause. Also, Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390, 11 S. W. 223 (1888),
where the court held that the dismissal by the prosecuting attorney of an illegal
warrant of arrest does not raise, in a suit for malicious prosecution, any inference
of want of probable cause.
1. 119 S. W. (2d) 25 (Mo. App. 1938).
17
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1939
RECENT CASES
should be exonerated; that it clearly appears they did not communicate to him
all the ascertainable facts; and that there was nothing in the plaintiff's conduct
that would create a suspicion that she had committed a crime. The court then
concludes its opinion by stating that when there is evidence of malice and want
of probable cause, these questions, "under proper instructions," are for the
jury, and that it is error to refuse to submit them to the jury.
In this country, the question of whether want of probable cause in a malicious
prosecution action is for the determination of the court or the jury seems well
settled. When the facts in the case are undisputed, almost all courts hold this
matter is for the court to decide.2 If the facts are not in dispute, in no case
should the issue of probable cause be submitted to the jury. When the facts
are in dispute, their existence is for the jury to determine, but whether those
facts constitute probable cause is a matter for the court.8 When the facts are in
dispute, the court in submitting them to the jury has two alternatives, either to
ascertain the facts in the form of a special verdict, and from those facts de-
termine whether or not probable cause exists, or to give the jury hypothetical
instructions that certain facts, if they so find them, will satisfy the requirements,
while if other facts are found the requirements will not be satisfied.4
The reason for this procedure is that the courts disfavor actions for malicious
prosecution, in that they discourage the bringing of criminals to justice. If each
time a man is prosecuted and is acquitted, he will bring an action against his
prosecutor, people will be much more reluctant to bring such prosecutions against
those whom they believe have committed a crime. Hence the courts take this
issue out of the hands of the jurors, who may be swayed by sentiment and
feelings for the innocent prosecuted. By this method there is judicial control
of malicious prosecution actions. 5
2. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187 (1878); Murphy v. Russell, 40 Ariz.
109, 9 P. (2d) 1020 (1932); Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Mann, 171 Ark. 350, 284
S. W. 42 (1926); Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222, 28 Pac. 937 (1892); Foster v.
Banks, 112 Cal. App. 622, 297 Pac. 106 (1931); Anderson v. Bryson, 94 Fla.
1165, 115 So. 505 (1927); Hearn v. Batchelor, 47 Ga. App. 213, 170 S. E. 203
(1933); Hendrie v. Perkins, 240 Ky. 366, 42 S. W. (2d) 502 (1931); Randall
v. Fenton Storage Co., 117 Pa. Super. 212, 177 Atl. 575 (1935); GREEN, JUDGE
AND JURY (1930) 342. Contr4a: Heyne v. Blair, 62 N. Y. 19 (1875). This case
reverses the former New York decisions, and holds that if the facts are capable
of more than one inference the question of probable cause is for the jury to
determine. The court bases its decision on the statement that, "Such is the
rule in all questions of the like character, and there is no reason why this class of
action should form an exception to the rule." See also Wilson v. Thurlow, 156
Iowa 656, 137 N. W. 956 (1912); Bennett v. Pillion, 105 N. J. L. 359, 144 Atl.
601 (1929).
3. See cases cited note 2, supra.
4. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187 (1878); Helwig v. Beckner, 149 Ind.
131, 46 N. E. 644 (1897); Erb v. German American Ins. Co., 112 Iowa 357,
83 N. W. 1053 (1900); Burton v. St. Paul, Minn. & M. Ry., 33 Minn. 189, 22
N. W. 300 (1885); L. R. A. 1915D, 12.
5. Ball v. Rawles, 93 Cal. 222, 28 Pac. 937 (1892); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY
(1930) 342; Note L. R. A. 1915D, 11.
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The Missouri holdings substantially conform to the general practice, but
in discussing the rule the courts of this state have used rather loose and am-
biguous language. It is clear in Missouri that, when the facts are undisputed,
probable cause is a matter of law for the court.7 In one case the Supreme Court
of Missouri held that, where the facts are disputed, the question is one of law,
based upon the hypothetical findings of the jury; yet, in absence of a request
by either party that the court charge the jury what facts will or will not amount
to probable cause, the omission to so charge is mere non-direction, and hence
not reversible error.8 Another case held that, for the court merely to define
probable cause and leave the determination of that element to the jury, was re-
versible error.9 In still another decision the court said that probable cause is a
mixed question of law and fact, and whether facts and inferences show probable
cause is a question of fact for the jury; whether facts, if true, develop probable
cause is an issue of law determinable by the court.10 But the Missouri courts
do not say how the disputed facts and the matter of probable cause should be
presented to the jury. To sustain the sound reason and spirit of the rule, the
most effective method seems to be that of the special verdict, which clearly
separates the function of the court from that of the jury on this matter. The
difficulty of instructing in the hypothetical is that often in such cases the facts
are many and involved, which makes the task of correctly framing the instruc-
tions to the jury a difficult and impracticable burden on the court. Also, even
though such instructions are correctly framed by the court, there is a great
possibility of the confusion of the jury in applying the facts found to the in-
structions.
In the instant case,1 the court expressed the view that the issue of probable
cause, when the facts are disputed, should be submitted to the jury "under
proper instructions." However, the court seems to arrive at the conclusion that
the facts were sufficiently undisputed to conclude that there was want of
probable cause. As the jury must have found in rendering a verdict for the plain-
tiff, there was no reversible error and the result of the case seems correct.
Yet the language of the opinion is ambiguous, if not misleading, as it does not in-
dicate the nature and form of instructions proper upon the issue of probable
cause.
THOMAS E. DEACY, JR.
6. Miller v. Brown, 3 Mo. 127 (1832); Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47, 67
S. W. 650 (1902); Thomas v. Smith, 51 Mo. App. 605 (1892).
7. See cases cited note 6, supra.
8. Thomas v. Smith, 51 Mo. App. 605 (1892).
9. Meysenberg v. Engelke, 18 Mo. App. 346 (1885).
10. Randol v. Kline's Inc., 322 Mo. 746, 18 S. W. (2d) 500 (1929).
11. La Font v. Richardson, 119 S. W. (2d) 25 (Mo. App. 1938).
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NEGLIGENCE-EXTENT OF LIABIInTY WHERE DEFENDAN't'S ACT CONCURS WITH
ACT OF GOD
The Inland Power & Light Co. v. Griegerl
This case involves the question of the extent of the liability of a defendant
when his negligence concurs with an act of God to cause an injury. A dam was
constructed on the Lewis River in the state of Washington by the Inland Com-
pany. The plaintiff owned a farm situated on a bend of the river below the
damsite. For many days prior to December 21, 1933, the rainfall in the sur-
rounding watershed was excessive. On December 21, the resulting high waters
flooded the plaintiff's farm to a height of about five feet. Up to this point, the
dam was in no way a cause of the flood conditions below it. On December 22,
the superintendent of the dam, thinking it best to retard the rise of the im-
pounded waters, opened the discharge gates to their maximum. This increased
the height of the waters below the dam five or six inches. Before the increase,
erosion of plaintiff's farm had already begun. It continued after the rise caused
by the opening of the discharge gates. The plaintiff requested that all the
damage subsequent to the opening of the gates be assessed against the owner
of the dam. He was successful in the trial court, and the defendant appealed to
the circuit court of appeals. The majority opinion held that where damage
results from the defendant's negligence and an act of God as concurring causes,
the defendant is liable to the same extent as though the damage had been caused
by his negligence alone. Judge Denman dissents vigorously, contending that the
impossibility of measuring the damage done by each separate cause is no ground
for holding the defendant liable for damage he did not cause.
Where damage is the result of two concurring causes, one of which is the
defendant's negligence and the other another person's negligence, the defendant
is liable to the same extent as though he alone had caused the damage. 2 This
is true whether it required the combined acts to produce the harm or whether
either alone was sufficient. The majority opinion contends the rule is no different
where one of the concurring causes is an innocent one, such as an act of God.s
1. 91 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), 112 A. L. R. 1075 (1938).
2. Adams v. Price, 45 Ga. App. 862, 166 S. E. 260 (1932); Owen Motor
Freight Lines v. Russell's Adm'r, 260 Ky. 795, 86 S. W. (2d) 708 (1985); Carr
v. St. Louis Auto Supply Co., 293 Mo. 562, 239 S. W. 827 (1922); Willi v.
United Rys. of St. Louis, 205 Mo. App. 272, 224 S. W. 86 (1920); Crespin
v. Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co., 39 N. M. 473, 50 P. (2d) 259 (1935); Northup
v. Eakes, 72 Okla. 66, 178 Pac. 266 (1918); Oklahoma Ry. v. Mount, 155 Okla.
275, 9 P. (2d) 11 (1932); Woodcock's Adm'r v. Hallock, 98 Vt. 284, 127 At.
380 (1925).
3. Salton Sea Cases, 172 Fed. 792 (C. C. A. 9th, 1909); American Coal
Co. v. DeWese, 30 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); Arkansas Land & Lbr. Co.
v. Cook, 157 Ark. 245. 247 S. W. 1071 (1923); Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v.
Swartz, 33 Colo. 225, 263 Pac. 728 (1928) ; Watts v. Evansville, Mt. C. & N. Ry.,
191 Ind. 27, 129 N. E. 315 (1921) ; Ford v. Wabash Ry., 318 Mo. 723, 300 S. W.
769 (1927); City of Richmond v. Cheatwood, 130 Va. 76, 107 S. E. 830 (1921).
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But there is a respectable line of authority supporting the view of the minority
opinion that, where one of the concurring causes is irresponsible, there is an
exception to the general rule of holding the defendant liable for the total dam-
ages.4 In the cases relied upon by the majority opinion, the problem is approached
mainly by the consideration of whether the defendant's act was a legal cause of
the injury. This goes to the fundamental problem of whether the defendant can
be held responsible at all. But having once decided the defendant's conduct is a
legal cause of the harm, there still remains the question as to what extent he is
liable. There is quite a difference in the two propositions.5 The cases agreeing
with the minority opinion, seem to recognize this difference. However, the
majority opinion makes no such distinction. Likewise, the Restatement of Torts
applies the same principles in determining whether the defendant's negligence
was a legal cause or not as it does in determining the extent of the damages for
which the defendant is liable.6
There are considerations which might well be taken to distinguish between
the situation where the acts of two negligent parties are concurring causes and
the situation where one of two concurring causes is irresponsible7 In the latter
case, since the plaintiff would have been injured to some extent regardless
of the defendant's actions and the plaintiff could not have recovered any damages
caused by the irresponsible cause had it acted alone, the plaintiff should bear
this loss himself. His recovery from the defendant should be limited to the
damage caused by the defendant's negligence.
On the other hand, it may be said that by excusing the defendant from any
responsibility for damage arising from the irresponsible cause, one is applying
the, "but for" test, which is properly used in determining when a cause is a
cause in fact of an injury, to determine the extent of the defendant's liability.8
This is a misapplication of that test. It has been suggested, in requiring the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant's acts were a substantial cause of the injury,
there is sufficient protection for the defendant. Perhaps the defendant should
not escape liability for the total loss, where his wrongful acts substantially
contributed to the injury, merely because other causes, some innocent and some
wrongful, contributed as well, for after all he was at fault. To hold otherwise
may unduly penalize an innocent plaintiff in favor of a wrongdoer. In com-
4. Note (1938) 112 A. L. R. 1084; Memphis & C. R. R. v. Reeves, 10 Wall.176, 190 (U. S. 1869); Law v. Gulf States Steel Co., 229 Ala. 305, 156 So. 835(1934) ; McAdams v. Davis, 200 Iowa 204, 202 N. W. 515 (1925) ; Pfannebecker v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 208 Iowa 752, 226 N. W. 161 (1929); Superior Coal &Builders' Supply Co. v. Board of Education, 260 Ky. 84, 83 S. W. (2d) 875(1935); Sherwood v. St. Louis S. W. Ry., 187 S. W. 260 (Mo. App. 1916);
Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. v. Martin, 37 S. W. (2d) 207 (Tex. 1931); Republican
Valley R. R. v. Fink, 18 Neb. 89, 24 N. W. 691 (1885); Radburn v. Fir Tree
Lbr. Co., 83 Wash. 643, 145 Pac. 632 (1915).
5. Note (1938) 112 A. L. R. 1084.
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 431, 454.
7. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage (1934) 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127.
8. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 941.
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paring the two theories, the difference in emphasis again appears: one approaches
the problem from the standpoint of the defendant and favors the apportion-
ment of damages; the other adopts the viewpoint of the plaintiff, emphasizing
mainly the defendant's causal relation, and does not favor apportionment due
to difficulties of proof.
Disregarding the authorities which seem to be divided, the equities of the
problem favor the apportionment of damages where one of two concurrent causes
is an irresponsible one. Just as the plaintiff should be compensated for the
destruction of his property caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant, so the
defendant should not be made to pay for damage he did not cause. The difficulty
in determining the degree of apportionment is not a satisfactory reason for
imposing a responsibility on the defendant for damage he did not cause.
HARRY P. THOMSON, JR.
NEGLIGENCE-LIAITY OF SUPPLIER OF CHAZWrELS MANUFACTURED BY THInD
PERSONS
Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co.'
In this case, the defendant motor agency sold automobiles manufactured
by another organization. One of the agency's salesmen took a car which had
been tested and driven by the motor company and drove it to the Shroder resi-
dence. There he turned the car over to Mr. Shroder so that it could be driven on
a trip by the Shroders as a part of the demonstration of its superior qualities.
The salesman, in turning the car over to the Shroders, said it was in perfect
condition. The next morning after having received the car, the Shroders began
a trip to Emporia, Kansas, from Kansas City, Missouri. While on the trip,
the car driven by the Shroders collided with another automobile. In the wreck
Mrs. Shroder was injured and she now sues for damages from personal injuries.
The cause of the collision was in dispute but the plaintiff's contention was that
the wheels of the car in which she was riding were packed with defective grease
so that the grease leaked onto the brake lining of one of the wheels causing
unequal braking pressure. Thus, when her husband applied the brakes hoping
to prevent the wreck, the car swerved into the path of the approaching automo-
bile. The packing of the grease in the wheel bearings was done by the manu-
facturer of the car. The Supreme Court of Missouri assumed that the grease
with which the wheel bearings were packed was defective, but even so it was
held that the defendant motor company was not liable for harm caused by latent
defects not discoverable by reasonable inspection of the chattels it lent, and
internal inspection of parts which appear externally to be in proper operating
condition was not necessary.
1. 111 S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1937).
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The court discusses the case as though it was one involving a vendor's
liability to his customer. Yet the facts of the case show that a sale was merely
contemplated by the parties. It was never completed. The placing of the
automobile in the hands of the prospective customer was to the interest of the
dealer, but the transaction remained one of bailment. However, it is justifiable,
as the court did in this case, to discuss the liability of a supplier, who is a bailor
for his own benefit, for defects in articles bailed by him without distinguishing
it from the liability of a supplier who is a vendor of chattels for defects in ar-
ticles sold by him, since there seems to be no fundamental difference in the li-
ability of each, particularly where there is privity of contract.2 Where the bail-
ment is regarded as only a step in the total transaction looking toward a sale,
this would seem especially true.
Where the supplier is to derive a benefit from supplying a chattel to another,
there are two theories upon which it is possible to base his liability for damage
caused by the chattel which he has supplied. One theory is that the supplier
impliedly warrants the article which he is supplying to be free from any hidden
defect whereby rendering it dangerous for the use to which it may be expected
to be put.3 The average buyer or bailee of a chattel should be entitled to rely
to some extent upon the reputation and the representations, implied and express,
of his supplier. The other theory commonly applied to these situations is neg-
ligence.4
For obvious reasons the duty of a dealer in chattels differs from that of a
manufacturer of chattels. He cannot be expected to have the same opportunity
for discovering defects. 5 But he is liable if he knew of the defect, or could
have discovered the dangerous character of the article by reasonable inspection. 7
Of course, the nature of the article and the supplier's peculiar knowledge and
opportunity for inspection will enter into determining what is a reasonable in-
spection. This does not place too great a burden on him. However, a dealer
need not take apart the product he is selling so as to destroy its unity in order
to discover latent defects and dangers. Thus a supplier cannot be held for the
2. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) §§ 388-390, 399; Spelky v. Kissel-Skiles Co.,
54 S. W. (2d) '61 (Mo. App. 1932); and annotation in (1935) 99 A. L. R. 241.
3. Annotations where the supplier is a bailor in (1921) 12 A. L. R. 774;
(1929) 61 A. L. R 1336. And see L. J. Smith Construction Co. v. Mullins, 198
Mo. App. 501, 201 S. W. 602 (1918); Where the supplier is a manufacturer see
Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products: Defec-
tive Automobiles (1938) 37 MicH. L. Rnv. 37; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168
Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932) (shatter proof glass causing injuries).
4. Kearse v. Seyb, 200 Mo. App. 645, 209 S. W. 635 (1919); Smith v.
Anderson Motor Service Co., 273 S. W. 741 (Mo. App. 1925); Spelky v. Kissel-
Skiles Co., 54 S. W. (2d) 741 (Mo. App. 1932).
5. 24 R. C. L. 509, § 802; 45 C. J. 890, § 328; Id. at 893, § 332.
6. Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 248; Bosserman v. Smith, 205 Mo. App. 657, 226
S. W. 608 (1920); Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-op. Society, [19021 1 K. B. 155.
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 402; Spelky v. ICissel-Skiles Co., 54 S. W.
(2d) 761 (Mo. App. 1932); West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 Atl. 965 (1901).
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dangers of a secret formula when he does not know the formula.8 Nor is a
dealer liable for the dangerous nature or condition of contents of sealed con-
tainers when to discover the danger he would have to break into the container9
In such cases the dealer has performed his duty to the buyer if he has taken every
precaution to see from the package's outside appearance that it is not dangerous,
in the absence of special information.
The opinion in the Shroder case bases the dealer's liability upon negligence
principles; but the court held the defendant not liable, not because it owed no
duty to see that the car was safe before it was turned over to the Shroders,
but because that duty was reasonably performed when the car was tested by the
agency's mechanics. The court said the agency should not be required to take
apart appliances which were found to be properly working under actual operation
by them. The fact that the agency's salesman told the Shroders the car was in
perfect condition when he turned it over to them might be a factor in favor of
considering the case on the basis of implied or even express warranty. But the
salesman's statement may be regarded as part of the usual sales talk that ac-
companies the normal attempted sale, particularly where he could not be ex-
pected to have more information about the car than that it was in good running
order. The opinion in the Shroder case is well reasoned and is the view ex-
pressed by the Restatement.10
HARRY P. THOMSON, JR.
NEGLIGENCF-LIABILITY OF A SUPPLIER OF CHATTELS: WHERE ONE CONNECTING
CARRIER DELIVERS TO ANOTHER
Brady v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis,
Defendant, largely a transfer or switching railroad, delivered to the Wabash
railroad a string of fifty cars on the latter's track. Plaintiff, employed by the
Wabash as an inspector, was directed by his employer to inspect the cars for the
purpose of discovering whether or not they were in good repair, in conformity
with the Safety Appliance Act and the rules and regulations of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. While inspecting an empty car belonging to the Wabash,
plaintiff climbed a ladder on the car and seized a grabiron on the roof. Because
of the decay and rottenness of the wood to which it was fastened, the grabiron
8. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r, 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770
(1912) ; Clement v. Rommeck, 149 Mich. 595, 113 N. W. 286 (1907).
9. Stone v. Van Noy R. R. News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W. 1092 (1913);
Noonan v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 104 N. J. L. 136, 139 Atl. 9 (1927),
56 A. L. R. 590 (1928); West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 Atl. 965, 53 L. R. A.
329 (1901).
10. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 402.
1. 340 Mo. 841, 102 S. W. (2d) 903 (1937). Some of the facts for the
statement of the case were taken from Brady v. Wabash Ry., 329 Mo. 1123, 49
S. W. (2d) 24 (1932).
19391
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tore loose, and plaintiff fell to the ground, receiving injuries. Plaintiff sued the
Wabash, founding his cause of action on the Federal Safety Appliance Act.
Recovery was denied on the ground that when plaintiff was injured the car was
not being used within the meaning of the act.2 In the instant case against the
Terminal, plaintiff based his theory of recovery on the Safety Appliance Act and
on common-law principles of negligence. It was held that, since the car was not
being hauled or used within the meaning of the act, defendant was not absolutely
liable for the injuries received by plaintiff, as having violated the act;" that since
defendant had relinquished control of the cars (though, in the legal sense, the
court says, the cars were in possession of defendant), and, since the cars were
rejected by the Wabash and returned to defendant only if they were defective
and unfit to continue their journey, inspection by the Wabash was not a
joint-enterprise of the two railroad companies, a matter of mutual interest and
concern, and the Wabash was a licensee of the defendant [for purposes of in-
spection?], and defendant was a licensee of the Wabash, and that, therefore,
defendant owed no duty to the Wabash to make an inspection of the cars and to
warn the Wabash of any defects that there might be in the cars, and, it follows,
no duty to plaintiff, who stood in the position of his employer.
It is an established principle of law that in a bailment of mutual benefit
and interest, or to the interest and benefit of the bailor, the bailor has the duty
to prepare the chattel bailed so that the bailee can use it with reasonable safety
for the purpose for which it was designed and intended, or to exercise reason-
able care to discover defects in the chattel bailed and to warn the bailee of those
defects. This duty is owed to the bailee and to all those who the bailor can fore-
see might use the chattel with the consent of the bailee.4 Accordingly, the gen-
eral rule is that a railroad supplying cars to a shipper to be loaded with freight
and delivered to a consignee is charged with a duty to exercise ordinary care
to provide that the cars are in such state of repair that employees of the shipper
and of the consignee, while exercising ordinary care, can enter them with rea-
sonable safety for the purpose of loading and unloading the cars.5 The principle
extends to the carrier delivering cars to the consignee, the delivering carrier
owing the consignee and his servants a duty to exercise due care to examine the
cars and to ascertain whether or not they are in such repair that servants of the
consignee, in the exercise of reasonable care, can unload them with reasonable
safety; and if cars are defective or in a dangerous condition, to make the neces-
2. Brady v. Wabash Ry., 329 Mo. 1123, 49 S. W. (2d) 24 (1932).
3. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed this
portion of the opinion, holding that the car was being used within the meaning
of the Act. 58 Sup. Ct. 426 (1938).
4. Notes (1921) 12 A. L. R. 774; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1336; Comment (1930)
78 U. op PA. L. RBv. 413; RESTArEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 392.
5. Roddy v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S. W. 1112 (1891); Sasnowski
v. Mobile & 0. R. R., 207 S. W. 865 (Mo. App. 1919); Doering v. St. Louis &
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sary repairs or to notify the consignee of the unsafe condition before delivering
them to him. 6 But the principles governing the respective rights and duties
among connecting or intermediate' carriers are not clear and definite, are not
general and uniform; and the language of the courts in considering problems
relating to these rights and duties is, in many cases, ambiguous-indeed, enigmat-
ic. Two conflicting rules appear: (1) the receiving carrier owes its employees
a duty to inspect cars tendered to it by another carrier before accepting them,
and the receiving carrier's failure to discharge this duty intervenes to cut off
whatever liability may attach to a delivering carrier for delivering defective cars
and breaks the causal connection between whatever negligence the delivering
carrier is guilty of in tendering defective cars and injuries to employees of the
receiving carrier resulting from the defects;r (2) the delivering carrier owes
employees of the receiving carrier a duty to inspect cars before delivering them
and to provide that cars are safe and in good repair or to warn the receiving
carrier of whatever defects there may be, and is liable for injuries resulting from
defects to employees of the receiving carrier, even though the receiving carrier
owes a duty to its employees to inspect and provide safe cars.8 There is no Mis-
6. Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. R.-R., 178 Mo. 693, 77 S. W. 723 (1903);
Hawkins v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 182 Mo. App. 323, 170 S. W. 459 (1914); see Doering
v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry., 63 S. W. (2d) 450, 451 (Mo. App. 1933); Markley
v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 338 Mo. 436, 90 S. W. (2d) 409 (1936).
7. In Glynn v. Central R. R. of N. J., 56 N. E. 698 (Mass. 1900), plaintiff
was the employee of a connecting carrier to whom defendant had delivered
a defective car. The court held that since the car had passed out of possession
and control of defendant and had passed the point where plaintiff's employer
was to inspect it, defendant's liability for the defect had ceased. In Lellis v.
Mich. Cent. R. R., 124 Mich. 37, 82 N. W. 828 (1900), defendant was the re-
ceiving company and plaintiff was its employee who was injured by reason of a
defective car delivered to defendant by another railroad. The court said that
the delivering carrier would not be liable, whatever its duty, but that defendant
was liable for breach of its duty owed plaintiff to discover and repair defects
of cars delivered to it by another company. In M. K. & T. Ry. v. Merrill, 65
Kan. 436, 70 Pac. 358 (1902), it was held that a delivering carrier was not liable
to employees of a receiving carrier for injuries resulting from defective cars,
because it was the duty of the receiving company to inspect the cars for the
purpose of preventing injuries to its employees, and the delivering company's
liability was cut off by the receiving company's failure to inspect, or by its care-
less inspection. It is also suggested that defendant was not liable because there
was no contractual relationship between defendant and plaintiff, so that de-
fendant owed plaintiff no duty at all.
8. In Moon v. Northern Pac. R. R., 46 Minn. 106, 48 N. W. 679 (1891), de-
fendant was held liable for death of plaintiff's intestate resulting from a de-
fective car which defendant had delivered to employer of plaintiff's intestate.
Though there was a traffic arrangement between the two carriers whereby both
companies were to inspect the cars and necessary repairs were to be made by
defendant, and though the receiving company would undoubtedly have been
liable to its employees for breach of its duty to inspect and reject defective cars,
yet the receiving company's failure to inspect, or its faulty inspection of, the
car causing the death did not operate as an intervening cause to cut off de-
fendant's liability. The court indicated that defendant's duty to plaintiff's
intestate was not necessarily founded on the contract between defendant and
employer of plaintiff's intestate, but that defendant would have had the same duty
even if transportation between the two lines had been carried on in obedience
to a statute or in performance of their common-law duties as carriers. In Penn.
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souri case involving the precise question of the rights and duties of connecting
carriers, but there are indications in some of the cases that the rule may well
be the first of the two propositions which we have induced of the cases.0
It may be suggested that in the instant case the court should have discussed
and disposed of the problem as involving the rights and duties of intermediate
carriers, rather than to have invoked principles and rules governing duties owed
to and rights of invitees and licensees, which principles and rules apply to the
occupation of land, and not to the possession and ownership of chattels.10 Be-
cause of the peculiar relationships of the carriers and plaintiff-that the cars
were still in the possession of defendant, though in the control of the Wabash, and
had been tendered by defendant for the purpose of inspection, to be accepted by
the Wabash or returned to defendant, depending on the results of the inspection
(which plaintiff was to conduct); that the cars had not been actually delivered
or received at the time of the accident, and plaintiff was not injured while the
R. R. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342, 45 N. E. 559 (1896), it was held that, even
though the receiving company, employer of plaintiff, had a duty to inspect cars
before accepting them from defendant, the delivering company was liable to
plaintiff for injuries resulting from a defective car delivered to plaintiff's em-
ployer; and that plaintiff could sue either company, at his election. Although
there was a traffic agreement between the two lines the court stated that
such contract was not necessary to raise defendant's duty to inspect and provide
safe cars, but that defendant was liable on pure negligence principles.
9. Dicta in several of the cases point to what probably would be the Mis-
souri rule. In Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 178 Mo. 693, 77 S. W. 723,
728 (1903), there is a statement to the effect that it is the duty of an inter-
mediate carrier to examine a car tendered to it to discover whether it is in a
reasonably safe condition to be hauled by it to its terminus, and there to be in
"such a condition that its connecting intermediate or ultimate carrier would
be bound to receive it for transportation from such intermediate carrier." In
this case plaintiff was an employee of the consignee and defendant was a con-
necting carrier. Defendant was not held liable for injuries resulting to plaintiff
from a defective car transported through one stage of the journey by defendant.
The language certainly does not clearly indicate the extent of the duty owed
to employees of a connecting carrier receiving a car from defendant, but the
suggestion is that it is not very onerous. The opinion, however, does state that
an intermedisie carrier owes no duty to servants of the consignee, because it
has no power of selection of the cars and cannot be charged with knowledge
that servants of the consignee will unload them. In Brady v. Wabash Ry., 329
Mo. 1123, 49 S. W. (2d) 24, (1932), there is a statement that it is the duty of
the receiving carrier to inspect for itself before accepting cars tendered to it
by another carrier, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the cars are
safe for transportation on its lines or for any other manner of handling. In
Doering v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry., 63 S. W. (2d) 450, 451 (Mo. App. 1933), the
court declares that an intermediate carrier has a duty only to examine a car
tendered to it for the purpose of determining whether or not it is reasonably safe
to be hauled by it to its terminus or connecting point, and there to be delivered
to the next succeeding carrier. The court also states the duty of a connecting
carrier to the consignee and his servants as does the court of Sykes v. St. Louis
& S. F. R. R., supra. It is submitted, then, that the first of our two general
propositions concerning the rights and duties of intermediate carriers may well
be the Missouri rule.
10. Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S. W. 1, (1909) ; Roman v. King,
289 Mo. 641, 233 S. W. 161 (1921), 25 A. L. R. 1263 (1923); Main v. Lehman,
294 Mo. 579, 243 S. W. 91 (1922); Achter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 105 S. W.
(2d) 959 (Mo. App. 1937).
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cars were being hauled or used on its line by the receiving carrier-it is difficult
to conjecture what result would have been obtained even if the court had applied
the principles relating to the rights and duties of connecting carriers. Perhaps
the real basis of the holding is, as the court intimates in the closing paragraphs
of the opinion, that plaintiff's injury was the result of "his own voluntary ex-
posure of himself to known and appreciated danger incident to the work in which
he was engaged."1
SAM BUSHMAN
NEGLIGENC_-LIABILITY OF SUPPLIER OF CHATTELS TO PERSONS OTHER THAN
PERSON SUPPLIED
Isbell v. Biederman Furniture Co.1
Plaintiff's husband purchased a wooden bed from defendant, a corporation
engaged in conducting a retail furniture store. Plaintiff's petition alleged that
the bed was not reasonably safe by reason of the fact that a piece on which
boards or slats of the bed rested was weak in that it contained a knot, was in-
sufficiently attached and of insufficient strength for use by plaintiff, and was of
insufficient strength for the use to which it was intended. Plaintiff's petition
further alleged that defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care would
have known, that said bed was not reasonably safe for use by plaintiff and was
negligently sold by defendant to plaintiff's husband for use by him and plaintiff,
all without protection or notice of any kind to plaintiff or husband. Plaintiff
further alleged that by reason of such defect the bed broke, whereby plaintiff was
caused to fall and suffer injuries. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the
petition on the allegation that it did not state facts sufficient to state a cause of
action and plaintiff appealed. The court of appeals held that a bed was not
an inherently or imminently dangerous article, that the purchaser usually in-
spects the article and might acquire some information of the defective construc-
tion, and that there was lack of privity between the plaintiff and defendant.
This case falls under the general situation of the liability of a supplier of
chattels. However, the law has not developed equally as to all forms of suppliers.
In the bailment cases, straight negligence principles have always been applied
and the bailor's obligation varies with the benefit the bailor is to receive.2 Where
11. Lucey v. Hannibal Oil Co., 129 Mo. 32, 31 S. W. 340 (1895); Minnier v.
Sedalia, W. & S. W. Ry., 167 Mo. 99, 66 S. W. 1072 (1902); Miller v. Mo. & Kan.
Tel. Co., 141 Mo. App. 462, 126 S. W. 187 (1910); Allen v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 294
S. W. 80 (Mo. 1927); Davis v. City of Independence, 330 Mo. 201, 49 S. W. (2d)
95 (1932).
1. 115 S. W. (2d) 46 (Mo. App. 1938).
2. See cases collected in Notes (1921) 12 A. L. R. 774; (1924) 31 A. L. R.
540; (1929) 61 A. L. R. 1336; (1935) 99 A. L. R. 240. For railroad cases, see
Roddy v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S. W. 1112; Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F.
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a duty exists on the part of the bailor, his responsibility extends to persons who
might be injured in the vicinity of its use and also to anyone who would use it
with the consent of the original bailee.8
The earlier Missouri approach in the liability of suppliers, such as manu-
facturers and vendors, was by the orthodox privity of contract rule,4 broadened
greatly by engrafting certain exceptions.5 In MdLeod v. Linde Air Products Go.0
these exceptions were extended until it would seem that the same result would
be reached as if straight negligence were applied. 7
An examination of recent Missouri decisions leaves some doubt as to just
what approach Missouri is taking in the vendor cases. In the recent supreme
court case of Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co.,8 straight negligence was ap-
plied. However, there the sale had not yet been consummated; hence the case
may more properly be considered a bailment. In Tayer V. York Ice Machinery
Corp.,9 the court talks both privity of contract and straight negligence, but it
would seem that the latter and better approach is controlling. In Jacobs v.
Frank Adams Electric Co.,' o the St. Louis Court of Appeals applied straight
negligence. The principal case seems to revert back to the older approach."
From a review of the recent cases, however, it would seem that Missouri has al-
most discarded the older position. However, a definite stand should be taken on
one approach or the other.
Assuming straight negligence was applied in the principal case, the retailer
might not have been negligent in failing to discover this defect. Most courts
hold that, where goods are purchased from a reputable manufacturer, it is not
R. R., 178 Mo. 693, 77 S. W. 723 (1903); Applegate v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R.,
252 Mo. 173, 158 S. W. 376 (1913) ; Allen v. Larabee Flour Mills Corp., 328 Mo.
226, 40 S. W. (2d) 597 (1931); Fassbinder v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 126 Mo. App. 563,
104 S. W. 1154 (1907); Strayer v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. R. R., 170 Mo. App. 514,
156 S. W. 732 (1913); Hawkins v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 182 Mo. App. 323, 170 S. W.
459 (1914); Doering v. St. Louis & 0. Ry., 63 S. W. (2d) 450 (Mo. App. 1933).
For automobile cases, see Smith v. Anderson Motor Service, 273 S. W. 741 (Mo.
App. 1925); Spelky v. Kissel-Skiles Co., 54 S. W. (2d) 761 (Mo. App. 1932).
3. See Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. R-v. 413.
4. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ex. 1842).
5. Heizer v. Kingsland and Douglass Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S. W. 630
(1892); Tipton v. Barnard and Leas Mfg. Co., 302 Mo. 162, 257 S. W. 791
(1924); See collection of cases in Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 1170; (1922) 17
A. L. R. 672; (1925) 39 A. L. R. 992; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 1243; (1929) 60 A. L. R.
371; (1929) 63 A. L. R. 340; (1931) 74 A. L. R. 343, 347; (1933) 86 A. L. R.
947; (1934) 88 A. L. R. 527; (1936) 105 A. L. R. 1502; (1937) 111 A. L. R. 1239.
6. 318 Mo. 397, 1 S. W. (2d) 122 (1927).
7. See McCleary, The Restatement of the Law of Torts and the Missouri
Annotations (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV. 28, 38. See also the beverage cases Stolle v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497, 39 A. L. R. 1001 (1925);
Madouros v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S. W.
(2d) 445 (1936); Nemela v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 104 S. W. (2d)
773 (Mo. App. 1937); and Note (1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 73; also critical notes in
(1937) 2 Mo. L. Rev. 235, 370 and 528.
8. 111 S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1937).
9. 119 S. W. (2d) 240 (Mo. 1937).
10. 97 S. W. (2d) 849 (Mo. App. 1936).
11. 115 S. W. (2d) 46 (Mo. App. 1938).
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negligence for the retailer to fail to inspect to discover latent defects.' 2 In the
case of canned or sealed goods purchased from reputable manufacturers, a cursory
inspection seems to be sufficient. A retailer may in the cursory inspection which
he gives to the goods while handling them for sale have an opportunity to dis-
cover defects. It is his duty to utilize his special opportunities and competence;
failure to inform his vendees that the goods are, or are likely to be, dangerous
is not excused by his ignorance, where such ignorance is due to his failure to use
his special opportunities and exert his special competence in discovering the
condition of the goods. 1" If the consumer is to be protected further on the
grounds of social policy and convenience, it may be done on a basis of implied
warranty, but in applying this theory of liability Missouri seems to require
privity of contract, except in the food and drink cases. 14
It might well be that under these principles the court reached the correct
result in the instant case. It would hardly seem, if the retailer purchased the
bed from a reputable manufacturer, that he was negligent in failing to test
the tensile strength of the piece on which the slats of the bed rested to discover
this defect. This basis for the decision seems more to accord with modern prin-
ciples of liability than that employed by the court.
J. BAIRD REYNOLDS
WIILS--CONTRAcTs NOT TO REvox JOINT AND MUTUA, WILLS
Plemmons v. Pemberton,
Crockett and George Wall executed wills in which each gave to the other
a life estate in both personal and real property with remainder to their sister
and her children. Crockett died and George had his will probated, receiving
the benefits thereunder. Subsequently, George made a second will disposing of
his estate in a different manner. The children of the sister sue to enforce the
provisions of an agreement between George and Crockett Wall not to revoke their
wills. Evidence was offered that the wills were identical in terms; that both
were drawn on the same day, at the same place, and witnessed by the same
persons; that each knew of the provisions of the other's will and that the brothers
had told several parties that they had made an "agreement" so that none of
their property would go to certain relatives, as some of the property of a de-
ceased brother had gone. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to
establish an agreement to make joint wills and not to revoke the same, and was
12. (1938) 22 MINN. L. REv. 743; 24 R. C. L. 509.
13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 402; Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co.,
111 S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1937).
14. See the cases and law review materials, cited supra note 7.
1. 117 S. W. (2d) 392 (Mo. App. 1938).
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therefore enforceable. The court said that the evidence need not be "direct" but
must be "clear, definite, convincing, unequivocal and satisfactory evidence."
The courts are not consistent in their usage of the terms "joint will," "mutual
wills," "reciprocal wills," "joint and mutual wills," et cetera. For purpose of
discussion it is necessary to set forth some distinction between these expressions.
A "joint will" will be taken to refer to a single instrument executed jointly by
two or more persons devising either separate or common property. "Mutual
wills" ale ordinarily those in which two or more persons execute two or more
wills with reciprocal testamentary provisions in whole or in part, but they
need not be executed jointly or simultaneously. All other terms are merely
variations of these two principal types.
2
The majority of cases hold that the question of whether there is a con-
tract not to revoke joint or mutual wills does not arise on probate,8 but must be
brought up in a suit to establish a trust. Equity will not decree specific per-
formance of the contract to make a will,4 nor will it compel a court of probate
to probate a revoked will.5 What equity does is to make the party who, because
of the revocation, gets that for which he pays nothing hold in trust for and
convey to the other party who would have taken under the will if it had not been
revoked.6 Some courts, however, consider it useless to force a party to go into
equity merely for the sake of retaining the principle that all wills are revocable
in their very nature.7
The right to revoke joint or mutual wills made in pursuance to a contract not
to revoke must be divided into two classes, namely those where one party re-
vokes before the death of either, and, secondly, those where one tries to revoke
after the death of the other. In the former situation most courts have held that
all makers of joint or mutual wills are privileged to revoke them in their life-
time,8 especially where notice is given.9 This means that the contract itself can
2. Partridge, Revocability of Mutual or Reciprocal Wills (1929) 77 U. or
PA. L. REV. 357-368; 1 GARDNER, WILLS (2d ed. 1916) 77.
3. ATKINSON, WLLS (1937) 175; Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N. W.
699 (1893); In re Keep's Will, 2 N. Y. Supp. 750 (Surr. Ct. 1888); Note (1926)
39 HAnv. L. REv. 663.
4. Van Meter v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 177 Atl. 799 (1935).
5. Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills (1931) 15 CORN. L. Q. 358-389.
6. Costigan, Constructive Trusts Based on Promises Made to Secure Be-
quests, Devises, or Intestate Succession (1915) 28 HARv. L. Rnv. 237, 246-51;
Sumner v. Crane, 155 Mass. 483, 29 N. E. 1151 (1892); Keasey v. Engles, 259
Mich. 178, 242 N. W. 878 (1932); Morgan v. Sanborn, 225 N. Y. 454, 122 N. E.
696 (1919); In re Gloucester's Estate, 11 N. Y. Supp. 899 (Surr. Ct. 1890);
Williams v. Williams, 96 S. E. 749 (Va. App. 1918).
7. Baker v. Syfritt, 147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910) ; Warwick v. Zim-
merman, 126 Kan. 619, 270 Pac. 612 (1928); In re McGinley's Estate, 257 Pa.
478, 101 Atl. 807 (1917).
8. Humane Society v. McMurtrie, 229 Ill. 519, 82 N. E. 319 (1907) (the
court, as many courts do, called the will a "jbint and mutual will" but it was
really a joint will with mutual provisions for disposition); Notes (1936) 102
A. L. R. 491; (1937) 108 A. L. R. 867.
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be rescinded.' 0 The purpose of notice is to allow the other party to revoke. There-
fore if one secretly revokes and dies first, that is a good revocation because the
survivor can also revoke." As to the second situation where one party tries to
revoke after the death of the other, it is held that he may do so even though
he accepted the benefits of the decedent's will because a will is in its nature
revocable.' 2 However, equity will impose a trust in favor of the beneficiaries of
the decedent's will.13 Of course, if there is no contract, then the parties may
revoke in either of the two situations just mentioned.' 4
An important question is raised by the principal case as to what sort of evi-
dence is necessary to establish a contract not to revoke. Such contracts may be
evidenced in a number of ways. First, there may be a written agreement, separate
from the will, not to revoke the same, or there may be an express contract to
make joint or mutual wills.' 5 While these are different in form they would seem
to have the same legal objective, for a contract to make joint or mutual wills
would seem to imply a contract not to revoke the same.
Secondly, the wills themselves may recite the agreement,16 but the mere
fact that the wills say they "have agreed to and with each other and do hereby
will, direct and devise" does not show a contract not to revoke.'7 If in the will
they agree not to revoke without consent of the other, then at least after the
death of one the survivor may not lawfully revoke.' 8 At least one court has
attached importance to the fact that the will contained the statement, "surviving
testator of the covenant," saying that the word "covenant" was evidence of a
contract not to revoke.' 9
In the third place the courts may find that the mere execution of a joint will
is evidence that there is a contract. As to mutual wills it seems well settled that
the mere execution is no evidence of a contract not to revoke, because the wills
might very well have been made without either party knowing that the other was
10. Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915) (joint will
with mutual dispositions); Anderson v. Anderson, 164 N. W. 1042 (Iowa 1917)
(mutual wills).
11. McClanahan v. McClanahan, 77 Wash. 138 (1913) (mutual wills).
12. Cawley's Estate, 136 Pa. 628, 20 Atl. 567 (1890) (mutual wills); Aniol v.
Aniol, 127 Tex. 576, 94 S. W. (2d) 425 (1936) (joint will).
13. Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N. W. 878 (1932); Williams v.
Williams, 96 S. E. 749 (Va. App. 1918).
14. Wilson v. Gordon, 73 S. C. 155, 163, 53 S. E. 79, 82 (1905).
15. Buehrle v. Buehrle, 291 Ill. 589, 126 N. E. 539 (1920) (mutual); In re
Krause's Estate, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P. (2d) 268 (1933) (mutual and contract
provided either could make a new will).
16. Warwick v. Zimmerman, 126 Kan. 619, 270 Pac. 612 (1928) (joint);
Rice v. Winchell, 285 Ill. 36, 120 N. E. 572 (1918) (mutual); Brown v. Brown,
101 Kan. 335, 166 Pac. 499 (1917) (joint); Sage v. Sage, 230 Mich. 477, 203
N. W. 90 (1925) (joint with mutual dispositions); Moore v. Moore, 198 S. W.
659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (joint).
17. In re Hoffert's Estate, 65 Pa. Super. 515 (1917).
18. Sage v. Sage, 230 Mich. 477, 203 N. W. 90 (1925).
19. Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934) (joint will). See very
vigorous dissent in this case.
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executing a similar will. 20 However, where joint wills are involved, there is great
confusion in the cases as to the importance of the execution. The majority and
the better view is that mere proof of execution without further evidence is not
enough; 2 ' but there is something to be said for the other line of authority which
holds the mere execution is evidence of a contract because parties will not ordi-
narily enter into a joint will unless they have some sort of an agreement as to
how they intend to leave their property. 22 Some courts say that only where
there is a "joint disposition" of property does the will itself evidence a contract
not to revoke. 23
Still another method of establishing a contract not to revoke is by showing
all the surrounding circumstances of its execution. The authorities are in
accord with the principal case in holding that the degree of proof must be "clear
and definite," 24 the same rule that applies to ordinary contracts to make wills.20
As to what constitutes "clear and definite" proof must depend on each particular
case. Courts have found a contract from the mutual exchange of wills and the
delivery to a third party beneficiary, 26 and from the fact consideration was
furnished by the beneficiary.27 But the fact that the parties merely stated before
the time of making the will that they intended to leave it to certain persons is not
enough.28 However, the fact that parties executed mutual wills because they
20. Knox v. Perkins, 86 N. H. 66, 163 Atl. 497 (1932) ; Flower v. Flower, 32
Ohio App. 350, 166 N. E. 914 (1928) ; Ridders v. Ridders, 156 Ore. 165, 65 P. (2d)
1424 (1937). But see Rastetter v. Hoenninger, 214 N. Y. 66, 108 N. E. 210 (1915)
(says it is revocable before death, but after death of one, the other could not
revoke).
21. Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 Pac. 450 (1928) (joint with mutual
dispositions); Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924) (joint with
mutual dispositions); In re Rhodes Estate, 277 Pa. 450, 121 Atl. 327 (1923)(court called it mutual but it was joint); Ross v. Sechler, 272 N. W. 854
(Wis. 1937) (joint).
22. Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill. 80, 90 N. E. 216 (1909); Baker v. Syfritt,
147 Iowa 49, 125 N. W. 998 (1910); Bower v. Daniel, 198 Mo. 289, 95 S. W.
347 (1906), but in Wanger v. Marr, 257 Mo. 482, 165 S. W. 1027 (1914), the
Missouri court disapproves of the Bower case on ground that, since wills are
ambulatory and revocable at any time during the life of the testator, an agree-
ment not to revoke must be established by the most clear and satisfactory evi-
dence; Hermann v. Ludwig, 186 App. Div. 287, 174 N. Y. Supp. 469 (2d Dep't
1919) ; Seat v. Seat, 113 S. W. (2d) 751 (Tenn. 1938) ; Williams v. Williams, 96
S. E. 749 (Va. App. 1918); Underwood v. Myer, 107 W. Va. 57, 146 S. E. 896(1929); Dufour v. Pereira, 1 Dick. 419 (Ch. 1769).
23. Beveridge v. Bailey, 53 S. D. 98, 220 N. W. 462 (1928).
24. Herrick v. Snyder, 27 Misc. 462. 59 N. Y. Supp. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1899);
In re Rosenblath's Estate, 146 Misc. 424, 263 N. Y. Supp. 303 (Surr. Ct. 1933)
("full and satisfactory proof").
25. MeElvain v. MeElvain, 171 Mo. 244, 71 S. W. 142 (1902) ; Grantham v.
Gossett, 182 Mo. 651, 81 S. W. 895, (1904) ; In re Rich's Estate, 199 Iowa 902,
200 N. W. 713 (1924); Brewer's Exr. v. Smith, 242 Ky. 175, 45 S. W. (2d) 1036
(1932); Anderson v. Collins, 222 S. W. 451 (Mo. 1920).
26. Chase v. Stevens, 34 Cal. App. 98, 166 Pac. 1035 (1917); Chambers v.
Porter, 183 N. W. 431 (Iowa 1921); Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills (1931)
15 CORN. L. Q. 358, 389.
27. Mayfield v. Cook, 201 Ala. 187, 77 So. 713 (1918).
28. Elmer v. Elmer, 271 Mich. 517, 260 N. W. 759 (1935).
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wanted to exclude certain parties is an indicia of an agreement not to revoke.29
As a whole, the courts have been liberal in finding contracts not to revoke joint
or mutual wills.3O
BARKLEY BROCK
29. Harris v. Morgan, 12 Tenn. App. 445 (1930) (mutual wills).
30. Stevens v. Myers, 91 Ore. 114, 177 Pac. 37 (1918) (mutual); Larrabee v.
Porter, 166 S. W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) (joint); Heller v. Heller, 233 S. W.
870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (joint); see also Eagleton, Joint and Mutual Wills
(1931) 15 CORN. L. Q. 358.
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